A natural generalization of the single-peaked elections is the k-peaked elections, where at most k peaks are allowed in each vote. Motivated by N P-hardness in general and polynomial-time solvability in single-peaked elections, we aim at establishing a complexity dichotomy of several control problems for r-approval voting in k-peaked elections with respect to k. It turns out that most N P-completeness results in general also hold in k-peaked elections, even for k = 2, 3. On the other hand, we derive polynomial-time algorithms for certain control problems for k = 2. In addition, we also study the problems from the viewpoint of parameterized complexity and achieve both F PT and W-hardness results. Several of our results apply to approval voting and sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting as well.
INTRODUCTION
Voting is a common method for preference aggregation and collective decision-making, and has applications in political elections, multi-agent systems, web spam reduction, etc. However, by the Arrow's impossibility theorem [1] , there is no voting system which satisfies a certain set of desirable criteria (see [1] for the details) when more than two candidates are involved. One possible way to bypass the Arrow's impossibility theorem is to restrict the domain of the preferences, for instance, the single-peaked domain introduced by Black [4] . Intuitively, in a single-peaked election, one can order the candidates from left to right such that every voter's preferences increase first and then decrease after some point as the candidates are considered from left to right. Recently, the complexity of various voting problems in single-peaked elections has been attracting attention of many researchers from both theoretical computer science and social choice communities [6, 13, 15, 16, 23] . It turned out that many voting problems being N P-hard in general become polynomial-time solvable when restricted to single-peaked elections. However, most elections in practice are not purely single-peaked, which motivates researchers to study more general models of elections. We refer readers to [7, 8, 9, 11, 14] for some variations of single-peaked model. In this paper, we consider a natural generalization of single-peaked elections, where more than one peak may occur in each vote. This generalization might be relevant for many real-world applications. For example, consider a group of people who are willing to select a special day for an event. In this setting, each voter may have several special days which he/she prefers for some reason, and the longer the other days away from these favorite days, the less they are preferred by the voter. We call this generalization k-peaked elections.
In this paper, we mainly study control problems for r-approval voting restricted to k-peaked elections. In a control attack, there is an external agent (e.g., the chairman in an election) who is willing to influence the results of the election by doing some tricks. There could be two goals that the external agent wants to reach. One goal is to make some distinguished candidate win the election. The other goal could be to make someone lose the election. The former case is called a constructive control and the latter case is called a destructive control. Moreover, the tricks involved in a control attack include adding some new, unregistered votes to the registered votes, deleting votes from the registered votes, adding new candidates to the election or deleting candidates from the election. We refer readers to [12, 18, 19] for further information on control attacks.
Approval voting is one of the most famous voting systems and has been extensively studied both in theory and in practice. In an approval voting, we are given a set C of candidates and a set V of voters. Each voter approves or disapproves every candidate c ∈ C. The system selects a candidate who is approved by the most voters as a winner. An r-approval voting is a variant of approval voting, where each voter v casts a vote πv, defined as a linear order (a transitive, antisymmetric, and total binary relationship) over the candidates, and approves the candidates ordered in the top r positions in πv and disapproves all other candidates. Particularly, 1-approval is also called plurality. Another prominent variant related to approval voting is the sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV for short), proposed by Brams and Sanver [5] . In an SP-AV election, each voter provides both a linear order of the candidates and a subset C of candidates such that the candidates are approved according to C, and the "admissible" and "sincere" properties should be fulfilled (see [5, 12] for the precise definition).
In the following, we consider only constructive control. Hemaspaandra et al. [18] proved that the control problems by adding/deleting votes for approval voting are N Pcomplete. The proofs can be adapted to show the N Pcompleteness of control by adding/deleting votes in SP-AV [12] . Lin [21] proved that control by adding votes in 4-approval and control by deleting votes in 3-approval are both N Pcomplete, while control by adding votes in 3-approval and control by deleting votes in 2-approval are polynomial-time solvable. As for the control by modification of candidates, approval voting turned out to be immune 1 to control by adding candidates and polynomial-time solvable for control by deleting candidates [18] . However, the control problems by adding/deleting candidates are N P-complete for r-approval, even when degenerated to 1-approval [19] . The N P-completeness also holds for control by adding/deleting candidates in SP-AV [12] . Recently, control in approval voting and r-approval voting have also been considered with respect to single-peaked elections. Faliszewski et al. [15] proved that the control problems by adding/deleting votes in approval are polynomial-time solvable in single-peaked elections 2 . Moreover, the control problems by adding/deleting candidates for 1-approval are polynomial-time solvable in single-peaked elections [15] .
Motivated by the N P-completeness in the general case and the polynomial-time solvability in the single-peaked case, we study the complexity of control problems for r-approval voting in k-peaked elections with respect to various values of k, aiming at exploring the complexity border for these control problems. Faliszewski et al. [14] studied a nearly single-peaked model which is called Swoon-SP and can be considered as a special case of 2-peaked elections. They proved that the control problems by adding/deleting candidates for 1-approval are N P-complete when restricted to Swoon-SP elections, implying the N P-completeness of these problems in 2-peaked elections. We complement their results by studying the adding/deleting votes case. Our findings are summarized in Table 1 . In particular, we show that, control by adding votes in r-approval with r being a constant is polynomial-time solvable in 2-peaked elections, but N Pcomplete in k-peaked elections for k ≥ 3. Meanwhile, if r is not a constant, then control by adding votes in r-approval in 2-peaked elections becomes N P-complete. Moreover, the deleting votes case turns out to be N P-complete for kpeaked elections with k ≥ 2, even for r being a constant.
In addition, we present some results for r-approval control problems with respect to their parameterized complexity. Recently, many voting problems have been studied from the perspective of parameterized complexity. See [2] for an overview. A parameterized problem is a language L ⊆ Σ * × N, where Σ is a finite alphabet. Given two parameterized problems Q and Q , an F PTreduction from Q to Q is an algorithm that takes as input an instance (I, κ) of Q and outputs an instance (I , κ ) of Q such that
(1) the algorithm runs in f (κ) · |I| O(1) time, where f is a computable function in κ;
(2) (I, κ) ∈ Q if and only if (I , κ ) ∈ Q ; and (3) κ ≤ g(κ), where g is a computable function in κ. Liu et al. [22] [3] complemented the results in [22] by proving that control by deleting candidates in 1-approval is W[2]-hard, with the number of deleted candidates as the parameter.
We extend the above results to k-peaked elections by showing that control by deleting candidates in 1-approval restricted to 3-peaked elections is W[1]-hard with the number of deleted candidates as the parameter. For the general elections, we present two FPT results for control by adding/deleting votes in r-approval voting, with r being a constant. Here, the parameter is the number of votes added/deleted.
Remarks: All our results apply to both unique-winner and nonunique-winner models. For the sake of clarity, our proofs and algorithms are solely based on the unique-winner model. The corresponding results for the nonunique-winner model can be derived in the similar way. Our N P-completeness results hold for approval voting and SP-AV as well. For N P-completeness results, we present only the N P-hardness proofs, since all problems studied are clearly in N P.
PRELIMINARIES
Multisets. A multiset S = {s1, s2, ..., s |S| } is a generalization of a set where objects are allowed to appear more than once, that is, si = sj is allowed for i = j. An element of S is one copy of some object. We use s ∈+ S to denote that s is an element of S. The size of S, denoted by |S|, is the number of elements in S. For two multisets A and B, we use A B to denote the multiset containing all elements from A and B, and use A B to denote the multiset containing, for each object s, max{0, n1 − n2} copies of s, where n1 and n2 denote the numbers of copies of s in A and B, respectively. For example, for A = {1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 4} and B = {1, 2, 3}, General Case
adding votes P ♠ r is not a constant: Table 1 : A summary of the complexity of r-approval control problems. Our new results are highlighted with underlines. "Thm. #" means that the result follows from Theorem # in this paper. The two FPT results are with respect to the number of added/deleted votes as parameters, respectively. Results marked by ♦ are from [21] , by ♣ from [19] , by ♠ from [15] and by from [14] .
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 
Here, L is partitioned into L1 and L2 with L1 = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) and L2 = (c6, c7, c8, c9, c10).
A B = {1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4} and A B = {1, 1, 3, 4}. A multiset B is a submultiset of a multiset A, if, for every object s that occurs n times in B, A contains at least n copies of s. We use B A to denote that B is a submultiset of A.
r-Approval. An r-approval election can be specified by a set C of candidates, a set V of voters where every v ∈ V casts a vote πv which is defined as a linear order over the candidates C. Each voter v contributes 1 point to each of the candidates ordered in the top r positions in πv and contributes 0 points to the other candidates. For convenience, we also use v to denote πv. For a vote v and a candidate c, the position of c in v is defined as |{c ∈ C | c v c}| + 1, where c v c means that c is ordered before c in v . The multiset of votes casted by V is denoted by ΠV . A winner is a candidate who gets the highest total score. If there is only one winner, we call it a unique winner.
For simplicity, sometimes we use (a1, a2, ..., an) to denote the linear order a1 a2 , ..., an. For a vote πv and a subset C ⊆ C, let πv(C) denote the partial vote of πv restricted to C such that in πv(C) every two distinct candidates in C preserve the same order as in πv. For example, for a vote
For a multiset Π of votes and a subset C ⊆ C, let Π(C) be the multiset of votes obtained from Π by replacing each π ∈+ Π by π(C).
Single-peaked/k-peaked elections. An election (C, ΠV ) is single-peaked if there is a linear order L of C such that for every v in ΠV and every three candidates a,
The candidate ordered in the first position of v is the peak of v with respect to L.
For an order L = (c1, c2, . . . , cm) of C and a vote πv, we say πv is k-peaked with respect to L, if there is a k-partition L1 = (c1, c2, ..., ci), L2 = (ci+1, ci+2, ..., ci+j), . . . , L k = (ct, ct+1, ..., cm) of L such that πv(C(Li)) is single-peaked with respect to Li for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where C(Li) is the set of candidates appearing in Li. See Fig. 1 for an example.
An election is k-peaked if there is an order L of C such that every vote in the election is k-peaked with respect to L. Here L is called a k-harmonious order.
Problem definitions. The problems studied in this paper are defined as follows. Throughout this paper, we fix p as the distinguished candidate.
r-Approval Control by Adding Votes in k-Peaked Elections (r-AV-k)
Input: An r-approval election (C ∪ {p}, ΠV ) with a multiset ΠT of unregistered votes, where both ΠV and ΠT are kpeaked with respect to a given k-harmonious order L, and an integer 0 ≤ R ≤ |ΠT |. Question: Are there at most R votes Π T in ΠT such that p is the unique winner/a winner in (C ∪ {p}, ΠV Π T )? r-Approval Control by Deleting Votes in k-Peaked Elections (r-DV-k) Input: A k-peaked r-approval election (C ∪ {p}, ΠV ) with a k-harmonious order L, and an integer 0 ≤ R ≤ |ΠV |. Question: Are there at most R votes ΠT in ΠV such that p is the unique winner/a winner in (C ∪ {p}, ΠV ΠT )? r-Approval Control by Deleting Candidates in k-Peaked Elections (r-DC-k) Input: A k-peaked r-approval election (C ∪ {p}, ΠV ) with a k-harmonious order L, and an integer 0 ≤ R ≤ |C|. Question: Are there at most R candidates C ⊆ C such that p is the unique winner/a winner in the election
We use r-AV, r-DV and r-DC to denote the above problems without the restriction of k-peaked elections, respectively.
2-PEAKED ELECTIONS
In this section, we study the control problems for r-approval in 2-peaked elections. The following three theorems summarize our findings. Theorem 1. r-AV-2 is polynomial-time solvable for every constant r.
Recall that r-AV is N P-complete for every constant r ≥ 4 but polynomial-time solvable when restricted to single-peaked elections [15] . Theorem 1 shows that the polynomial-time solvability of r-AV remains when extending from single-peaked elections to 2-peaked elections, for r being a constant. This bound is tight as indicated by the following theorem. More precisely, if r is not a constant, r-AV becomes N P-complete in 2-peaked elections, in contrast to the polynomial-time solvability in the single-peaked case [15] .
Theorem 2. r-AV-2 is N P-complete, if r is not a constant.
The control problem by deleting votes for r-approval is polynomial-time solvable in single-peaked elections for even non-constant r [15] . The following theorem shows that by increasing the number of peaks only by one, this problem becomes N P-complete.
Theorem 3. r-DV-2 is N P-complete for every constant r ≥ 3.
Proof of Theorem 1
We prove Theorem 1 by giving a polynomial-time algorithm based on dynamic programming.
Let ((C ∪ {p}, ΠV ), ΠT , L, R) be an instance of r-AV-2. For c ∈ C, let ← − c (1) be the candidate lying immediately before c in L and ← − c (i) be the candidate lying immediately before ← − c (i − 1) in L. Similarly, we use − → c (1) and − → c (i) to denote the candidates lying immediately after c and Given an order A = (a1, a2, . . . , an), a discrete interval I over A is a consecutive sub-order (ai, ai+1, . . . , ai+t) of A. We denote the first element ai by l(I) and the last element ai+t by r(I). We also use A(l(I), r(I)) to denote I. Let S(I) denote the set of elements appearing in I and set |I| := |S(I)|. For example, for a discrete interval I = A(3, 6) over the order A = (2, 5, 3, 10, 4, 6, 0), S(I) is {3, 4, 6, 10}. A kdiscrete interval over an order A is a collection of k disjoint discrete intervals over A, where "disjoint" means no element in A appears in more than one discrete interval. For a kdiscrete interval I, let S(I) = I∈I S(I). Observation 1. For each k-peaked election (C, ΠV ) associated with a k-harmonious order L over C, and each vote πv ∈+ ΠV , there is a k -discrete interval I over L such that 0 < k ≤ k and 1(v) = S(I).
By Observation 1, for every vote πv in a 2-peaked election associated with L as a 2-harmonious order, 1(v) can be represented by a 2-discrete interval or a 1-discrete interval over L. See Fig. 2 for an example.
We first derive a polynomial-time algorithm for 4-AV-2. It is easy to generalize the algorithm to r-AV-2 with r being a constant. The following observation is trivial.
Observation 2. Every true-instance of r-AV has a solution where each added vote approves p.
Due to Observation 2, we can safely assume that for each πv ∈+ ΠT , p ∈ 1(v)
= (c3, c4, c7, c6, c8, c9, c5, c2, c10, c1) and πu = (c7, c6, c5, c8, c9, c10, c1, c4, c3, c2). Each vote gives one point to its top four ordered candidates.
1
We then can try all possibilities of how many votes in the solution are from each of the four types of votes in S. This reduces the original instance to at most R 4 sub-instances. Thus, in the following, we assume that every vote in ΠT is represented by a 2-discrete interval. Let ΠT = (πv 1 , πv 2 , ..., πv |T | ) be an order of ΠT such that r(I
Our dynamic programming algorithm uses a binary dynamic table DT (i, j, s, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, si,1, si,2, si,3), where we set DT (i, j, s, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, si,1, si,2, si,3) = 1 if there is a submultiset Π T {πv 1 , πv 2 , . . . , πv i } satisfying
2) and c6 = − → p (3); and (5) SC V∪T (ci,t) = si,t for all t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where ci,1 = r(I p v i ), ci,2 = ← − ci,1(1) and ci,3 = ← − ci,1 (2) . (See Fig. 3 for an illustration of (4) and (5) (4) and (5) in the definition of DT .
It is easy to see that the given instance is a true-instance if there is a DT (n, R , s, s1, s2, . . . , s6, sn,1, sn,2, sn,3) = 1 for some n ≤ |ΠT |, R ≤ R, s ≤ SCV (p) + R − 1 and s ≤ s for all s ∈ {s1, s2, ..., s6, sn,1, sn,2, sn,3}. Therefore, to solve the problem we need to calculate the values of DT (i, j, s, s1, s2, . . . , s6, si,1, si,2, si,3) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ R, j ≤ i ≤ |ΠT |, 1 ≤ s ≤ SCV (p) + R − 1 and s ≤ s for all s ∈ {s1, s2, ..., s6, si,1, si,2, si,3}. Thus, we have at most |T | · R · (|V| + R) 10 entries to calculate. We use the following iterative recurrence to update the table. DT (i, j, s, s1, s2, . . . , s6, si,1, si,2, si,3) = 1, if at least one of the following cases applies: ∃DT (i1, j − 1, s, s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s 6 , s i 1 ,1 , s i 1 ,2 , s i 1 ,3 ) = 1 such that conditions (1)-(4) hold. Case 2. ∃s ∈ {s1, s2, ..., s6, si,1, si,2, si,3} with s = s and ∃DT (i1, j − 1, s − 1, s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s 6 , s i 1 ,1 , s i 1 ,2 , s i 1 ,3 ) = 1 such that conditions (1)-(4) hold.
The four conditions are:
(2) st = s t + SC {v i } (ct) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 6; (3) si,t = s i 1 ,t 1 + SC {v i } (ci,t) for all ci,t = ci 1 ,t 1 ; and
The algorithm is easy to be generalized for r ≥ 4 by using a bigger but still polynomial-sized dynamic table.
Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2 by a reduction from a variant of Independent Set which is N P-complete [20] .
Let ( ) denote an empty order containing no element. 
A Variant of Independent Set (VIS)
Input: A multiset T = {T1, T2, ..., Tn} where each Ti ∈+ T is a set of discrete intervals of size 4 over (1, 2, ..., 12n) and |Ti| ≤ 3 for all Ti ∈+ T . Question: Is there a set S ⊆ T ∈ + T T of discrete intervals such that |S| = n, |S ∩ Ti| = 1 for every Ti ∈+ T and no two discrete intervals in S intersect?
Given an instance E = (T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}) of VIS, we construct an instance E = ((C ∪ {p}, ΠV ), ΠT , L, R = n) for r-AV-2 as follows.
Let I = T ∈ + T T . For each discrete interval I ∈ I, let l(I) be its left endpoint and r(I) be its right endpoint. Let Γ be the set of all elements appearing in some discrete interval of I, i.e., Γ = {S(I) | I ∈ I}. Let Γ = (x1, x2, . . . , x |Γ| ) be an order of Γ where xi < xi+1 for all i ∈ [|Γ| − 1].
Candidates: We create three kinds of candidates C, D and E: (1) C = Γ; (2) D contains exactly 2n − 1 candidates d1, d2, . . . , dn, . . . , d2n−1; (3) E contains exactly (n + 3) · (|C|+|D|−1) dummy candidates x 1 , x 2 , ..., x |C|·(n+3) , d 1 , d 2 , ..., d (n+3)·(|D|−1) which will never be winners. The distinguished candidate is dn, that is, p = dn. Moreover, r = n+4.
2-Harmonious Order: L = ( Γ, D, E) where D = (d1, d2, ..., d2n−1) and E = (x 1 , ...,
Unregistered Votes ΠT : For each Iij ∈ Ti ∈+ T , create a corresponding unregistered vote which is defined as
Clearly, this vote approves exactly all four candidates lying between l(Iij) and r(Iij) (including l(Iij) and r(Iij)) in L and all candidates lying between di and di+n−1 (including di and di+n−1) in L. Thus, every unregistered vote approves dn.
It is clear that all votes are 2-peaked with respect to L. Due to the construction, it is easy to see that SCV (c) = n − 2 for all c ∈ C, SCV (di) = n − i − 1 for all di ∈ D with i ∈ [n − 1], SCV (di) = i − n − 1 for all di ∈ D with i ∈ {n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n − 1}, and SCV (c) ≤ n − 2 for all c ∈ E and SCV (dn) = 0.
⇒: Suppose that E is a true-instance and let S be a solution for E. Let S = (I1, I2, . . . , In) be an order of S where Ii = S ∩ Ti for all i ∈ [n]. Then, we can make dn the unique winner by adding votes from ΠT according to S. More specifically, for each Ii ∈ S we select its corresponding vote constructed as above and add it to the election. Clearly, the final score of dn is n. Due to the construction, no two added votes πv and πu which correspond to two different intervals Ii and Ij, respectively, approve a common candidate from C. Thus, after adding these votes to the election, no candidate in C has a higher score than that of dn. To analyze the score of dj ∈ D with j ∈ [n − 1], we observe that for any i > j the vote corresponding to Ii does not approve dj. Since SCV (dj) = n − j − 1 and |S ∩ Ti| = 1 for all i ∈ [j], we know that the final score of dj is less than n. Similarly, to analyze the score of dj ∈ D with j ∈ {n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n − 1}, we observe that for any i ≤ j − n the vote corresponding to Ii does not approve dj. Since SCV (dj) = j − n − 1 and |S ∩Ti| = 1 for all i ∈ {j −n+1, j −n+2, ..., n}, we know that the final score of dj is less than n. The final score of each c ∈ E is clearly less than n − 2 since no unregistered vote approves c. Summarize the above analysis, we conclude that the distinguished candidate dn becomes the unique winner after adding the selected votes to the election.
⇐: Suppose that E is a true-instance and S is a multiset of votes chosen from ΠT which makes dn the unique winner in the election (C ∪ D ∪ E, ΠV S ). It is easy to verify that |S | = n, since otherwise, at least one of C would be a winner; thus, the final score of dn is n and every c ∈ C can get at most one point from S . Therefore, no two votes in S approve a common candidate of C, implying that S must be a set. Let P1, P2, . . . , Pn be a partition of ΠT where Pi contains all votes corresponding to the intervals of Ti ∈+ T . Clearly, Pi is a set. We claim here that |S ∩Pi| = 1 for every i ∈ [n]. Suppose this is not true, then there must be a certain Pi with |S ∩ Pi| ≥ 2. Let S1 = S ∩ Pi (thus, |S1| ≥ 2), S2 = {πv ∈ S ∩P i | i < i} and S3 = {πv ∈ S ∩P i | i > i}. It is clear that |S1| + |S2| + |S3| = n. Since all votes in S1 approve both di and di+n−1, all votes in S2 approve di but do not approve di+n−1, and all votes in S3 approve di+n−1 but do not approve di, then,
Thus, at least one of di and di+n−1 has final score at least n, contradicting that dn is the unique winner. The claim is true. It is now easy to see that the set of discrete intervals corresponding to S forms a solution for E.
Proof of Theorem 3
We first prove that 3-DV-2 is N P-hard by a reduction from Vertex Cover on bounded degree-3 graphs which is N P-complete [17] . Then, we will show that the proof applies to r-DV-2 for r ≥ 4 with a slight modification.
An undirected graph is a tuple G = (V, E) where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges. We also use V (G) to denote the vertex set of G. For a vertex u ∈ V , NG(u) denotes the set of its neighbors in G, that is, NG(u) = {w | (w, u) ∈ E}. The degree of a vertex u is the number of its neighbors. A graph is a bounded degree-3 graph if it contains at least one degree-3 vertex but no vertex having degree greater than 3. A vertex cover for a graph G = (V, E) is a subset S ⊆ V such that every edge in E has at least one of its endpoints in S.
Vertex Cover on Bounded Degree-3 Graphs (VC3) Input: A bounded degree-3 graph G = (V, E) and a positive integer κ. Question: Does G have a vertex cover of size at most κ?
To prove the N P-hardness of 3-DV-2, we first introduce a property for bounded degree-3 graphs. This property may be of independent interest since many graph problems are N P-hard when restricted to graphs with bounded degree 3.
An interval over the real line is a closed set [a, b] = {x ∈ R | a ≤ x ≤ b} where a and b are real numbers. An interval is trivial if a = b. For an interval I, denote by l(I) and r(I) its left-point and right-point, respectively. A t-interval is a set of t intervals over the real line. A graph G = (V, E) is a tinterval graph if there is a set TG of t-intervals and a bijection f : V → TG such that for every u, w ∈ V , (u, w) ∈ E if and only if f (u) and f (w) intersect. Here, TG is called a t-interval representation of G. For simplicity, we use Iu = {I t u } to denote f (u). For two real numbers a and b with a ≤ b, we define (a, b) = {x ∈ R | a < x < b}.
The following lemma states that every bounded degree-3 graph has a 2-interval representation such that every vertex is represented by a 2-interval with one interval is trivial, and two 2-intervals only intersect at the endpoints.
Lemma 4. For every bounded degree-3 graph G there is a 2-interval representation for G such that for every u ∈ V (G), Iu = {I 1 u , I 2 u } satisfies one of the following:
Moreover, such a 2-interval representation can be found in polynomial time. See Fig. 4 for an example.
We now show the reduction. Let E = (G, κ) be an instance of VC3 and I(G) be a 2-interval representation of G satisfying all conditions in Lemma 4. For every Iu = {I Let Γ = (x1, x2, . . . , x |Γ| ) be the order of Γ with xi < xi+1 for all i ∈ [|Γ| − 1]. We construct an instance E = ((C ∪ {p}, ΠV ), R = κ, L) of 3-DV-2 as follows.
Candidates: C = Γ ∪ {p, c1, c2, c3, c4} with c1, c2, c3, c4 being dummy candidates, which would never be winners.
2-Harmonious Order: L = ( Γ, p, c1, c2, c3, c4).
Votes: There are two types of votes: votes disapproving p and votes approving p. There are |V (G)| votes of the first type each of which corresponds to an Iu in I(G) for u ∈ V (G). More specifically, for every Iu, let (xi, xj, x k ) be the order of D(u) with xi < xj < x k , then we create a vote πu
. Thus, πu approves D(u). Due to Lemma 4, either xi or x k lies consecutively with xj in L, that is, one of xi = ← − xj(1) and x k = − → xj(1) must hold, which implies that all votes of the first type are 2-peaked with respect to L. There are only two votes of the second type: (p, c1, c2, c3, c4, L(p, x1]) and (p, c3, c4, c1, c2, L(p, x1]). It is clear that these two votes are 2-peaked with respect to L.
In the following, we prove that E is a true-instance if and only if E is a true-instance.
(⇒:) Suppose that E is a true-instance and S is a vertex cover of size at most κ of G. Then, we delete all votes in {πu | u ∈ S}. After deleting these votes, no two votes of the first type approve a common candidate in C, since otherwise, V (G) \ S could not be an independent set, contradicting the fact that S is a vertex cover. Thus, after deleting these votes all candidates except for p have only one point. Since p has two points, p is the unique winner.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a true-instance. Observe that every true-instance of 3-DV has a solution containing only votes which do not approve p. Let S be such a solution of size at most κ. Therefore, p has two points in the election after removing all votes in S ; thus every other candidate can have at most one point after removing all votes of S , which implies that no two votes of the first type approve a common candidate in C in the final election, further implying that the vertices corresponding to S form a vertex cover of size at most κ for G.
In order to prove that r-DV-2 is N P-hard for any constant r ≥ 4, we need to modify the proof slightly. First, we add some dummy candidates. More specifically, there are t = r − 3 dummy candidates Xi = {x ) between xi ∈ Γ and xi+1 ∈ Γ in the 2-harmonious order L whenever there is a u ∈ V (G) such that [xi, xi+1] ∈ Iu. Besides, we have other 2r − 6 dummy candidates c5, c6, ..., c2r−2 lying after c4 in L, with the order (c5, c6, ..., c2r−2). Thus, there are totally t · |V (G)| + 2r − 6 new dummy candidates here. We change the first type of votes as follows: for every u ∈ V (G) with c2r−2]) ). As for the second type of votes, we have still two votes defined as ( x1] ), respectively. Then, with the same argument, we can show that r-DV-2 is N P-hard for any r ≥ 4.
3-PEAKED ELECTIONS
In Section 2, we proved that control by adding votes in r-approval is polynomial-time solvable when restricted to 2-peaked elections and r being a constant. In this section, we show that the tractability of the problem does not hold when extended to 3-peaked elections.
Theorem 5. r-AV-3 is N P-complete for every constant r ≥ 4.
Proof. We first prove the N P-hardness of 4-AV-3 by a reduction from Independent Set on bounded degree-3 graphs which is N P-complete [17] . An independent set in a graph G = (V, E) is a subset S ⊆ V such that every edge in E has at most one of its endpoints in S. Independent Set on Bounded Degree-3 graphs (IS3) Input: A bounded degree-3 graph G = (V, E) and a positive integer κ. Question: Does G have an independent set containing exactly κ vertices?
For an instance E = (G, κ) of IS3, let I(G) be a 2-interval representation of G which satisfies all conditions in Lemma 4. Let D(u), Γ and Γ be defined as in Subsect. 3.3. We construct an instance E = ((C ∪ {p}, ΠV ), ΠT , L, R = κ) of 4-AV-3 as follows.
Candidates: 
Unregistered Votes ΠT : For each u ∈ V (G), let (xi, xj, x k ) be the order of D(u) with xi < xj < x k . We create a vote c3] ). Due to Lemma 4, either xi or x k lies consecutively with xj in L; thus, all these unregistered votes have 3 peaks xα, x β and p where {xα, x β } ⊆ {xi, xj, x k } ({xα, x β } depends on whether xj lies consecutively with xi or with x k ), with respect to L.
In the following, we prove that E is a true-instance if and only if E is a true-instance. It is easy to see that SCV (x) = κ−2 for all x ∈ C \{p, c1, c2, c3}, SCV (p) = 0 and SCV (c) ≤ κ − 2 for all c ∈ {c1, c2, c3}.
(⇒:) Suppose that E is a true-instance and S is an independent set of size κ. Then we add all votes corresponding to S, that is, all votes in {πu | u ∈ S}, to the election. Since S is an independent set, no two added votes approve a common candidate except p; thus, each candidate except p has a final score at most κ − 1. Since each added vote approves p, it follows that p has a final score of κ points, implying that p becomes the unique winner in the election including the new votes.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a true-instance and S is a solution. Clearly, p has a final score of κ points. Since p is the unique winner, for every c ∈ C \ {p}, there is at most one vote in S approving c. Thus, no two votes in S approve a common candidate except p. Due to the construction, the vertices corresponding to S must be an independent set.
The proof applies to r-AV-3 for any constant r ≥ 5 by a similar modification as discussed in Subsect. 3.3.
PARAMETERIZED COMPLEXITY
In this section, we study several control problems for rapproval from the viewpoint of parameterized complexity. The first two FPT results are for the general case.
Theorem 6. r-DV is FPT with the number of deleted votes as the parameter, where r is a constant.
Proof. To derive the FPT algorithm, we divide the candidates C into two parts: C1 = {c ∈ C | SCV (c) ≥ SCV (p)} and C2 = C \ C1. Meanwhile, we divide ΠV into two parts: ΠV 1 = {πv ∈+ ΠV | ∃c ∈ C1 with c ∈ 1(v)} and ΠV 2 = ΠV ΠV 1 . That is, ΠV 1 contains all the votes which approve at least one candidate which has at least the same score as p, and ΠV 2 contains other votes. We observe that every true-instance of r-DV has a solution S with S ΠV 1 . Due to the observation, we can restrict our attention to ΠV 1 . Since at most R votes can be deleted and each deleted vote approves at most r candidates, |C1| ≤ r · R holds for every true-instance. We assume now that |C1| ≤ r · R in the given instance. We say two votes have the same type if they approve the same candidates. Clearly, there are at most O((r · R) r ) different types of votes in ΠV 1 . Since every solution includes at most R votes from each type of votes, we have at most R O(f (R)) cases to check where f (R) = R r , implying an FPT algorithm for r-DV.
Theorem 7. r-AV is FPT with the number of added votes as the parameter, where r is a constant.
Faliszewski et al. [14] proved that control by deleting candidates in 1-approval is N P-hard when restricted to Swoon-SP elections. Since Swoop-SP is a special case of 2-peaked elections, 1-DC-k with k ≥ 2 is N P-hard. We strengthen this result by proving that 1-DC-3 is W[1]-hard with the number of deleted candidates as the parameter. Proof. We prove the theorem by an FPT reduction from Independent Set which is W[1]-hard [10] . For a linear order A = (a1, a2, ..., an) over A = {a1, a2, ..., an} and a subset B ⊆ A, denote by A \ B the linear order of A \ B obtained from A by deleting all elements in B. For an instance E = (G = (V, E), κ) of Independent Set we construct an instance E of 1-DC-3 as follows.
Candidates: V ∪ {p, a, a1, a2, ..., aκ, b, b1, b2, ..., bκ}.
3-Harmonious Order: Let F = (c1, c2, ..., cn) be an (arbitrary) order of V . Then, the 3-harmonious order L is given by (bκ, bκ−1, ..., b1, b, p, a, a1, a2, . .., aκ, c1, c2, ..., cn). Number of Added Candidates: R = κ.
(⇐:) It is easy to verify that E is a true-instance implies E is a true-instance: for every independent set S of size κ, deleting the candidates S from the election clearly make the distinguished candidate p become the unique winner.
(⇒:) Suppose that E is a true-instance and S is a solution with |S | ≤ κ. We first observe that b ∈ S . This observation is true, since otherwise, all candidates in {b1, b2, ..., bκ} must be deleted, contradicting that |S | ≤ κ. The same argument applies to the candidate a. However, in order to beat b, exactly k candidates from V must be deleted so that p can get extra k points from the constructed votes of case 5. Since |S | ≤ κ, S must be a subset of V . Moreover, no two candidates c1, c2 ∈ S are adjacent to each other in the graph G, since otherwise, the candidate a would get at least one extra point from the constructed votes of case 4, and p cannot be the unique winner. Thus, S forms an independent set of size κ of G.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the k-peaked elections which generalize the single-peaked elections by allowing at most kpeaks in each vote. We derive a dichotomy of the complexity of control problems for r-approval voting in k-peaked elections with respect to k. Moreover, we present some results concerning the parameterized complexity of these problems in general as well as k-peaked elections. All of our results work for both unique-winner and nonunique-winner models. In addition, several of our results apply to approval voting and SP-AV as well. Another possible research direction could be studying more strategic behaviors for other voting systems in k-peaked elections.
